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Introduction by Dr John Leslie1
 
 
Dramatic events in Central Europe in Autumn 1989—particularly demonstrations on 
the streets of Leipzig and East Berlin—often overshadow the accounts of the high-
stakes diplomacy that ended the Cold War division of Germany and Europe. This 
account by a member of the West German team that negotiated the ‘Two-plus-Four’ 
Treaty between the two Germanies, France, the UK, Soviet Union and United States 
puts the spotlight on the monumental issues resolved in a frenetic period of 
diplomacy between February and July 1990. The treaty leading to German unification 
managed issues central to modern Europe’s bloodiest conflicts—state sovereignty and 
national self-determination—by preserving and extending Western Europe’s 
multilateral institutions. Negotiators trod a narrow path between sceptics in East and 
West, unifying Germany without undermining Europe’s multilateral political and 
security order founded on NATO and the European Community. Rather than raising 
the German Question anew, the ‘Two-plus-Four’ Treaty unified Germany by 
extending eastward the Federal Republic’s postwar commitments to the West. 
Ambassador Luy provides a first-hand account of how this fortuitous chain of events 
unfolded. 
 
Transcript of the Talk given by Julius Georg Luy at the 
Christchurch Town Hall on November 25, 2010, as part of the 
EUCN annual conference "European Integration at 60: Progress, 






In early 1989 the GDR’s Communist Party chief, Erich Honecker, expressed his 
confidence in the perpetuity of the Berlin Wall: “The Wall will be standing in 50 and 
even in 100 years, if the reasons for it are not removed.” And in August 1989, in the 
run-up to the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic the same 
                                                 
1 Lecturer in Political Science, Victoria University of Wellington.  
2 This text presents the personal views of the author only. 
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Honecker even rhymed: “Den Sozialismus in seinem Lauf halten weder Ochs noch 
Esel auf” (“Neither an ox nor a donkey is able to stop the progress of socialism.”) 
Honecker was wrong on both statements. The socialism in Central and Eastern 
Europe and even in the Soviet Union had started to collapse long before - and the 
Berlin Wall collapsed for the same reason 3 months later. Less than one year after its 
40th anniversary the GDR vanished from the political landscape of Europe. 
Last 3rd October we celebrated 20 years of German Unity. That occasion reminds not 
only of the results, but as well of the historical processes which led to German Unity. 
The most famous and the most decisive one is the peaceful revolution set into motion 
by the East German citizens. They in fact were the driving force of the more technical 
processes leading to German unity – which are the internal (i.e. intra-german) and 
the external aspects of unification. The two processes were closely intertwined. 
The focus of today's talk is on 2 + 4, i. e. the external aspects of unification. What 
makes the process and the result of 2 + 4 worth to be revisited – even twenty years 
after its conclusion and implementation? 2 + 4 addressed, bundled and settled major 
issues of 20th century foreign policy: the sovereignty of states, the right of peoples to 
national self-determination, cooperative arrangements for security and stability in 
sensitive geopolitical situations, the final settlement of World War II consequences in 
Central and Western Europe. All these aspects make 2 + 4 a worthwhile exercise in 
studying diplomatic craftsmanship and political history. 
 
Collapse of the East European communist/socialist regimes 
 
2 + 4 did not take place in a historical vacuum. In 1989 – the year when the German 
unification process started - East Germany and Eastern Europe were in a precarious 
phase of their history. In 1989 the open breakup of the communist system had just 
begun. The system evidently had not lived up to its promises – and even 
Gorbachev'svigorous reforms by “glasnost” and “perestroika” in Russia could not save 
it anymore, proving right Gorbachev’s famous remark “Life punishes the latecomer.” 
The longstanding freedom and civil rights movements particularly in Poland 
(Solidarity) and in Czechoslovakia (Charta 77) had chartered a way on which many 
other East European countries followed. 
 
In East Germany the situation was particularly backwards. The East-West partition 
went through one nation. It divided families, towns and regions, cut through an 
established society and – notwithstanding the war ravages – a promising national 
economy. Germans in the GDR always looked over the fence to Germany’s other half. 
Therefore, by TV, radio, by family relations and by smuggled books and newspapers 
they were well aware, that the pastures in the West were much greener than in the 
GDR. This left the GDR in a precarious situation – right from its beginning. The lack 
of stability favoured the emergence of a particularly rigid government and police 
system. The Berlin-Wall (actually an intra-German wall!) symbolized this evidently. 
In May 1989 Hungary opened its borders with Austria and thus cut the first hole in 
the Iron Curtain which shielded Eastern Europe from Western Europe. But when the 
CSSR then closed its borders with Hungary - on East-Berlin's instigation, Germans 
who wanted to leave East Germany for the West found a new outlet. They took refuge 
in West German Embassies in Eastern Europe and asked for a West German passport 
and consular protection – which they were entitled to as Germans. This happened in 
the summer  of 1989 in particular in Prague and Warsaw, but as well in other capitals 
and even in East Berlin, in the West German Permanent Representation. 
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Calls for German Unity 
 
In Germany, the regular Monday demonstrations and other popular mass events, the 
rising number of Germans fearlessly applying for permission to leave the GDR and its 
increasingly desolate economic situation led on 9 November 1989 to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. However, the opening of the Brandenburg Gate did not just open safety 
valves and then return to East German normalcy as the communist regime might 
have hoped initially. On the contrary - it really opened the dams widely and 
irreversibly. The free flow of East Germans to West Germany led to an unprecedented 
exodus. Until end of 1989 more than 340.000 Germans had left the GDR for West 
Germany, over 2 percent of the GDR’s entire population. 
 
The dynamics of this situation overburdened both German states, economically, 
socially and politically. For politicians in East and West there was no doubt that 
something had to happen to stop this mass exodus. But East Germans were not sure 
about the durability of the new situation. They had no confidence in the regime – still 
staffed by the old communist nomenclatura. And they did not want to wait more 
years for economic prosperity realized in the West. They wanted the hard German 
mark immediately – the symbol of West German post-war success and achievement, 
which for more than 40 years they had enviously observed just as onlookers. 
 
In this situation the first tender blossoms of thinking the unthinkable occurred. The 
first calls for German unity did not come from politicians who could not muster the 
fantasy, the courage or even the will for a United Germany. It came from the East 
Germans – who changed their street-slogan from “we are the people” (before the wall 
fell) to “we are one people” in the time after. Helmut Kohl was one of the first 
politicians who grasped this signal and turned it into a bold (though from hindsight 
still cautious) move to bring the two German states together. On 28 November 1989 
he proposed in Parliament a 10 points program, with a long-term perspective towards 
a confederation of the two German states.  
 
Kohl’s move – not at all coordinated with the Four allied Powers, not even with his 
own Foreign Minister Genscher - created considerable irritation, particularly among 
his European colleagues in Paris, London and Moscow. Some grim muscle-flexing 
(using the Four Power rights and responsibilities) – like impromptu visits by 
President Mitterrand in Kiew and East Berlin and by PM Thatcher in a number of 
European capitals followed. There was even a strangely anachronistic meeting of the 
four allied ambassadors in the Berlin Control Council’s building – a symbol of the 
Four Powers’ occupational role and not used since 18 years – which expressed the 
nervousness and resistance towards what was soon accepted as unavoidable. But in 
the end all four Powers – the Soviet Union last - jumped onto the bandwagon of 
German unity – not the least in order to shape events instead of being overthrown by 
the popular movement’s tidal force. 
 
The Four Powers – with their different political weight, geographical position and 
historical background - emphasised different aspects in their basic approval to enter 
German unification on an operational level. The US took earliest an easy and 
constructive approach to German Unity - mainly strategy, security and stability 
related. They were eager to preserve or to bring about a sound and stable European 
architecture, with full NATO membership of the united Germany. France as 
Germany's closest neighbour was particularly anxious to firmly embed a united 
Germany into a more deeply integrated European Union. The idea of an economic 
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and currency union certainly got a vital boost from the French position. France 
furthermore wanted a rock-solid recognition of the united Germany’s boundaries as 
final, particularly with Poland. The UK had concerns like no other of the western 
powers by its age old fear of destabilization on the continent and possible distortions 
of the continent’s power balance by a weighty, powerful, free-floating united 
Germany. It saw NATO membership and a further enlargement of the European 
Community as the best means to achieve a managed balance and stability for the 
European continent with the German weight balanced by a large network of 
European partners. The Soviet Union naturally had the most difficulties accepting 
German unity. It was mainly interested in security related aspects, the military status 
of a united Germany and even in its neutrality. Furthermore, the Soviets emphasized 
border guarantees and territorial claims and wanted to embed the united Germany in 
a more developed and institutionalized CSCE process. 
 
2 + 4 enters the stage 
 
These short descriptions outline only very roughly the complex positions of the 
respective actors. There was hectic interaction of diplomatic and political talks and 
events – from December 1989 until early February 1990 - to translate the framework 
of the various positions into a procedural concept. Two major milestones were the 
plan for an economic, monetary and social union, announced by the two German 
states on 7 February and the visit by Kohl and Genscher to Moscow on the 10/11 
February 1990. In Moscow the German leadership received the Kremlin’s assurance 
that it was for the Germans alone to decide on the timing of unification and on the 
specific way to reach it. The way to the 2 + 4 talks was free. But the structure of the 
talks realised in the end German essentials: 
2 + 4  and not only 4: No four power negotiations about Germany - with a 
minor status for the two German states sitting at the side table (as was the case in 
1954). This was unthinkable for all Germans and any hint in that direction was clearly 
refused. Therefore these were talks with Germany, on an equal level, not talks about 
Germany. 
2 + 4 and not 4 + 2  The negotiations were first and foremost a matter of the 
2 German states, to be talked about with the four Allied Powers. The first ranking 2 
expressed the centrality of the two German states in these negotiations.  
2 + 4 and not 2 + X Limitation to the Four Powers – in recognition of their 
continuing legal rights and responsibilities related to Berlin and Germany as a whole. 
This meant: no expansion of the talks to other neighbours, in particular no 
Conference about a Peace Treaty with Germany. Such a conference could have 
included more than 100 states all over the world and would have assured years, if not 
even decades of negotiations. However, Poland for its unique geographical and 
historical situation with Germany would have to be given particular consideration. 
External only It was a clear understanding that these talks were limited to 
the external aspects of Germany unity. Internal aspects – like the intra-German 
unification Treaty, the choice of how unification happened and questions like the 
German economic and currency union - were exclusively a matter of the two German 
states. On this line the 6 foreign ministers announced in Ottawa on the margins of the 
NATO/WP conference about “open skies,” on 13 and 14. February 1990, that they will 
meet and talk about external aspects of German unity, “including security aspects of 
neighbouring states.” This was the first time the 2 + 4 formula entered the public. 
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The 2 + 4 process starts 
 
The 2 + 4 process has been described as a roundtable with sharp corners. What were 
the sharpest corners of this roundtable? 
 
• Membership in military alliances:  The two German States were major 
pillars in their respective military alliances, in NATO and Warsaw Pact. What 
would happen to their respective memberships at unification? Would the 
united Germany be member in either NATO or Warsaw Pact (though nobody 
thought of the latter question seriously), would it be neutral or even member 
in both alliances (as Gorbachev had even proposed once)? 
• Stationed Troops: What should happen with the foreign soldiers stationed 
on both sides of the intra-German border? The real concern for both German 
states was however the Red Army only which had 380 000 Soviet troops 
stationed in the GDR. Would the Soviets give up their military - and political - 
leverage in Central Europe and if: when and how could it be made sure, that 
they left, in a structured process and with a fixed schedule? 
• Borders of the united Germany: Where would the external borders of the 
united Germany be? This was a question particularly sensitive for the German 
border with Poland. The Federal Republic of Germany had not formally given 
up its legal position with respect to the former German territories, which after 
the war became part of Poland (mainly Pomerania, Silesia and Eastern 
Prussia). No responsible German politician seriously thought about asking 
these large territories back – but symbolically it was an important domestic 
policy issue in Germany. 
• Central European Stability: Hiding behind this is the “Deutsche Frage,” 
the “German question.” With its unification Germany would be by far the most 
populous and in a tangible perspective the economically most powerful 
country in Europe. This had historically proved to be a major challenge for 
Europeans throughout the 20th century as witnessed by two World Wars. How 
could a repetition of historical precedents be prevented? The united Germany’s 
firm embedding in the European Union was emphasized particularly by 
France. But NATO membership was an effective stabilizing constraint too, an 
argument which would play out later in the talks. The Soviets however pressed 
for more extended and institutionalized CSCE structures, with their own 
participation 
• Full sovereignty of the united Germany The sovereignty of the two 
German States was limited by the four powers’ rights. Though both states had 
gained sovereignty regarding their own affairs since the Fifties, the Four Power 
had upheld their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as 
a whole. Could these rights be totally abolished to avoid any continuing “droit 
de regard” by the Four Powers? For the German side there was only one 
option: total abolishment of the Four Power status from day 1 of unification, 
no perennial special status for Germany, which would have singled it out in the 
international community ever after. 
 
The 2 + 4 negotiations 
 
Talks took place on the level of senior civil servants (mainly political directors) who 
prepared the four meetings which then were held on the Foreign ministers level, in 
Bonn, East Berlin, Paris (with Poland) and finally in Moscow on 12. September. The 
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start of the talks set a number of parallel processes into motion. I will limit myself to 
two main aspects: 
 
1. Polish Border 
 
This question was one of the most sensitive political questions, for Germany as well 
as for Poland and other neighbours, particularly France. In Germany no responsible 
politician questioned seriously the finality of the German external borders. However, 
the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945 between the allied Powers had stated, that the 
final delimitation of Poland’s Western frontier should be made dependent on a peace 
settlement. The German Chancellor referred to this legal aspect when avoiding any 
clear commitment towards the finality of the existing German/Polish border. This 
was apparently for tactical, domestic reasons, since the Federal elections in West 
Germany were due end 1990 and Kohl was afraid of large gains for a radical right 
wing party if he “gave away” one fifth of the former German territory. 
However, after getting under increased pressure externally and internally for his 
position, Kohl reached an agreement in the governing coalition on the 6th March 
1990 which settled the issue domestically in accordance with what Germany’s 
neighbours expected – and in line with what the overwhelming majority of Germans 
had approved anyway. In the 2 + 4 ministerial in Paris on 17 July, 1990, with the 
Polish Foreign Minister Skubiczewski participating, this issue was settled 
internationally too and was dealt with in Art. 1 of the 2 + 4 Treaty. The Germans 
committed to concluding a border treaty with Poland after unification and the 
achievement of full German sovereignty. This treaty was signed on the 14th 
November 1990 in Warsaw and ratified end of 1991, after signature of a second 
German – Polish Treaty on good neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation. 
 
2. Military status of the united Germany 
 
This issue emerged as the make-or break-question of 2 + 4 (right until the last night 
before its signature!). Whereas the two German states and the Western Powers 
insisted on NATO membership for the united Germany, the Soviet Union clearly had 
the united Germany’s neutralization in mind. To bring these opposing positions in 
alignment developed into one of the professionally most exciting challenges of 
diplomatic history.  
 
The West’s argument against neutralization was clear: a neutral Germany in its 
precarious geopolitical position would cease to be embedded in a security 
arrangement. Alone, lacking the support of its former allies it would have to arm itself 
more heavily than ever before. Politically it would freely float around in central 
Europe – and the “German Question” would loom again on the horizon! And this was 
not only a Western argument: Germany’s neighbours and the Soviet Union’s allies 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary fully shared this argument – leaving the 
Kremlin isolated in this question. 
 
However, Gorbachev had a point. Extending the NATO territory to the GDR meant a 
decisive shift of balance in Central Europe. How should Gorbachev seriously sell such 
a concept to the hardliners in Moscow, reversing one of the most important results of 
the second World War? Wouldn’t the West ask the Soviet leader to commit political 
suicide? Even the US with their staunch line on the alliance seemed to be impressed 
by this dilemma and reflected shortly on an only associated membership of Germany 
in NATO. The German FM Genscher in an address in Tutzing/Bavaria end of January 
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1990, took a different approach. He advanced the idea that Germany should stay in 
NATO but that NATO structures should not be extended to the GDR territory. 
 
However, the Soviet Union rejected vigorously any link between NATO and the 
united Germany, throughout the first ministerial 2 + 4 in Bonn, 4/5 May 1990. This 
was one of the main reasons too, for the Soviet rejection of the approach by which the 
two German states wanted to reach their unity: not by a merger, setting up a new 
constitution and rules for the united Germany, but rather by a provision in the West 
German constitution (the Basic Law) which allowed the simple accession to the 
Federal Republic of Germany of other parts of Germany (Art. 23). By such accession 
of the GDR territories they would nearly automatically take over the international 
obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany, including NATO and EC 
membership. Though this was an intra-German question only - Moscow rejected the 
accession via Art. 23 because of its international consequences. 
 
After the first (and last) free elections in the GDR on 18 March 1990, however, the 
two German states confirmed Art. 23 of the constitution and accession as the way 
they would take. For them there was no feasible alternative to reaching unity 
expeditiously in view of the quickly increasing disintegration of the GDR. Now 
Moscow dropped its opposition against instant unification under Art. 23. Instead it 
brought up a proposal to decouple internal and external unification, meaning that full 
sovereignty for the united Germany would be postponed – at least for 5 years as 
Shevardnadse later specified. Kohl rejected this proposal as it could have meant 
partial neutralization of Germany. Further Soviet suggestions included Germany to 
stay out of NATO’s integrated structure or even double membership of the united 
Germany in both military alliances, NATO and Warsaw Pact.  
 
But despite these rear guard battles a package deal - more or less on the lines of the 
later 2 + 4 Treaty - began to emerge: 
• NATO forces and structures would not be advanced into GDR territory; 
• Soviet troops would stay in the GDR for a transitional period; 
• the prosperous Germany would help the Soviets with problems arising from 
the troops withdrawal, in particular housing; 
• limitations of the united Germany’s armed forces strength would be 
introduced and 
• further agreements regarding NATO’s character and strategy and an 
institutionalized setup of the CSCE rounded off the package. 
 
This package deal was firmly pushed through by the Western side, showing at the 
same time its good will to solve understandable Soviet concerns. The NATO 
ministerial meeting on 5 and 6 June 1990 in Turnberry Scotland and the London 
Declaration by heads of state and government (6 July) sent out an unprecedented 
signal of friendship and cooperation to Moscow and made a number of specific arms 
control proposals which did not fail to impress the Soviet Union. The “Turnberry 
Message” essentially anticipated the London declaration and helped Gorbachev in 
time to convince his growing critics ahead of the 28th Party Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party in early July 1990. 
 
The breakthrough followed in the meeting between President Gorbachev and 
Chancellor Kohl in the Caucasus from 14 – 16th July. Here the two statesmen had a 
number of talks with decidedly personal-private character. At the end Gorbachev 
conceded, that the united Germany would gain full sovereignty upon unification and 
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would be free to decide by itself whether it wanted to belong to a military alliance. 
Kohl made it clear that from his view this would be the Atlantic alliance. An 
agreement would be concluded with the Soviet Union about the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops within three to four years. NATO structures would not be extended to the 
former GDR’s territory as long as Soviet troops were still present there. Germany 
would commit - in Vienna - to reduce its forces to 370.000. It would confirm its 
renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and its membership to the NPT.  
 
With this breakthrough the 2 +4 negotiations entered the final stretch. The “Treaty 
on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” was signed in Moscow on the 12th 
September 1990, in the Hotel Oktjabrskaja. The foreign minister of the Four Powers 
suspended their allied rights and responsibilities on the 1st October. The way for a 
united and sovereign Germany on the 3rd October 1990 was free. 
 
Looking back  
 
Looking back we can confirm what Genscher said: The 2 + 4 Treaty is the most 
important and promising agreement that the Federal Republic of Germany had ever 
concluded. Within 7 months of negotiations it totally turned around a political and 
legal situation, which seemed to be irreversibly locked by history. However, the 
achievement of many politicians and diplomats would not have been possible without 
the courage and the steadiness of the East German people. They created and upheld 
the political pressure, which served directly the speed of negotiations and the search 
for compromise. Without this speed the negotiations might have stranded in a 
situation where Gorbachev lost more and more ground to his opponents in the Soviet 
leadership and where he or his successor would not have been anymore in a situation 
to pave the way for German unity. In the end luck played its role, too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
